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Better Access to Justice, Better Access to Attorneys'
Fees - The Procedural Implications of Scarborough v.
Principi
By Jamie H. Kim*
"And there is not a Member of this body who has not
found on his or her doorstep citizens who have been
wronged by their own Government. At worst, a career
or a life may be ruined; at best, the individual has
been wrongly accused and has had to incur great
expense to clear his name.
I. INTRODUCTION
Big versus small, strong versus weak, and rich versus poor -
these are three universal themes portrayed in our daily lives through
means such as media, culture, and politics. A familiar antagonist in
popular culture is the government - "venal, corrupt and hostile to
justice"' - while its usual adversary is the individual man - the
"wronged and powerless . . .who against all odds triumph[s] over
* J.D. candidate, May 2006, Pepperdine University, School of Law; B.A.
Business Economics, 2002, University of California, Los Angeles. The author
thanks her family and friends for their support during the writing of this article, and
Professor Gregory Ogden and the J.NAALJ staff for their insight. The author
wishes to dedicate the article to her mother, a daily source of strength and virtue,
and her father, whose memory continues to nurture and inspire.
1. 131 CONG. REc. S2731 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1985) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers).
2. Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening the Law: Ideology and Law in
American Popular Culture, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 149 (2005) (describing
how government is portrayed by mainstream directors in films such as THE GRAPES
OF WRATH (20th Century Fox 1940) and MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON
(Columbia Pictures 1939)).
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faceless . . . wrongdoers." 3 Yet, one must wonder how many
wronged individuals actually attain such "triumph" when faced
''against all odds."
Imagine that you are a private citizen of modest means clearly
and unjustly wronged by the government. Would you accept
automatic defeat by those with more resources and more money? Or,
rather, would you challenge or defend regardless of the time it will
take and the costs you will undoubtedly incur? Naturally, time and
money will weigh heavily in your decision. The good news,
however, is that a law exists that says if you win your case against
the government, a court can make the government pay your legal
fees. So you agree to have your day in court, and you win your case.
Then bad news arrives - your attorney tells you that he made a
simple yet careless mistake in applying for the fees. Then worse
news - he cannot fix his mistake and you must pay for the fees.
Robbed of attorneys' fees at the end of the long and arduous search
for justice, have you really "triumphed?"
Conversely, place yourself in the position of the government.
You just lost your case in court and are now preparing to pay the
other party's legal fees pursuant to a certain law. To your complete
surprise, opposing counsel was careless and did not adhere to that
law. What could be better than a situation where you, and in turn
taxpayers, save some money?
In light of these two opposing views, who should bear the
winning party's fees? Interpreting the law one way, the private
citizen will "triumph." Interpreting the law another way, the
government will "triumph." Should the consequences be shouldered
by the individual, who had no hand in his attorney's careless mistake,
or the government, who happened to get by on a technical error?
The Supreme Court's ruling in Scarborough v. Principi
("Scarborough")4 addresses and answers these questions. The
decision affects the protection Congress intended to give private
citizens as potential litigants wronged by arbitrary government
action.
This note examines the Scarborough decision and its
implications. Part II reviews the foundations of the decision
3. Mezey & Niles, supra note 2, at 111.
4. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
regarding a prevailing party recovering attorneys' fees from the
government. Part III outlines the facts of the case. Part IV reports
and analyzes the Court's majority and dissenting opinions. Part V
examines the legal impact of the Scarborough decision, its impact on
our federal government, and the broader impact it has on the nation
and its people. And Part VI concludes the note.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the United States, parties to a lawsuit must pay their own
attorneys' fees.5 This means that a prevailing party must expend
monetary costs even when he wins his case. The United States is the
only common law country to follow this procedure, hence it is coined
the American Rule.
6
In 1796, the United States Supreme Court first adopted the
American Rule in Arcambel v. Wiseman.7 The Court held that the
general practice in the United States is for litigating parties to be
5. Joseph J. Ward, Comment, Corporate Goliaths in the Costume of David:
The Question of Association Aggregation Under the Equal Access to Justice Act -
Should the Whole Be Greater Than its Parts?, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 151, 156
(1998).
6. Comment, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 639 (1974) (describing the practices of awarding attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party in ancient Rome, French civil practice, and early
Sweden). The countervailing rule to the American Rule is the English Rule, which
allows the prevailing party in a lawsuit to recover attorneys' fees from the losing
party. Id. at 640. This practice is commonly referred to as "fee-shifting." The
early American legal system followed the English Rule of fee-shifting, but
abandoned it in the late 1700's. Valerie H. Philbrick, Comment, Attorney Fees in
Contract Disputes in Ohio: Nottingdale Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Darby,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 561, 564 (1990). Legal scholars cite different reasons for the
change. One theory is that the early colonists, having just separated themselves
from British control, wanted to separate themselves of all British influences. See
id. at 564. Another theory relates to distrust and hostility towards the early legal
profession. Amid a newfound individualistic spirit, early laws were relatively
straightforward and simple enough that anyone could understand them. Id. So
early Americans may have felt no need for a rule that benefited an unnecessary
profession since poor and rich alike could represent themselves. Id. Others
suggest state legislatures simply forgot to increase the amounts of legal fees that
could be recovered as inflation increased, leading to the recovery amounts
eventually being forgotten. Id.
7. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
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responsible for their own attorneys' fees absent express statutory
authorization.
8
The Supreme Court generally cites three reasons in support of the
rule. 9 First, the uncertainty of litigation makes it unfair to penalize a
losing party by assessing costs and fees for merely defending or
prosecuting a lawsuit.' °  Second, the Court did not want to
discourage the poor from vindicating their rights." Third, separate
claims for costs and fees might increase the time, expense, and
difficulties of proof in any given case and would substantially burden
the administration of justice. 12
Like most other rules, the American Rule regarding attorneys'
fees comes with exceptions. Initially, after the American Rule was
adopted, there were three generally recognized common law
exceptions - the common fund exception, the bad faith exception,
and the private attorney general doctrine.' 3 The common fund
exception allowed someone who created, increased, or protected a
common fund for the benefit of others to be reimbursed for his legal
fees from the fund.' 4 Under the bad faith exception, a prevailing
8. Id.
9. In comparison, there are also substantial justifications for the English Rule.
See infra notes 10-12.
10. See Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967). Supporters of the English Rule counter that the only way to make a
prevailing litigant whole is to hold the "losing party" liable for the expenses he
caused. Philbrick, supra note 6, at 566.
11. See Fleishmann Distilling, 386 U.S. at 718. Supporters of the English Rule
counter that it does not discourage the poor from seeking justice, but actually
encourages parties to bring small, meritorious claims that normally would not be
litigated due to lack of funds. Philbrick, supra note 6, at 566.
12. See Fleishmann Distilling, 386 U.S. at 718 (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 82
U.S. 211, 231 (1872)). Supporters of the English Rule counter that it promotes the
settling of civil disputes without having to resort to litigation, which reduces the
size of court dockets. Philbrick, supra note 6, at 566.
13. Libbi J. Finelsen, Litigation Issue: Attorneys' Fees, 22 ENVTL. L. 1293,
1293 (1992). These three common law exceptions were in place before Congress
enacted any statutory exceptions.
14. Id.; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257
(1975) (providing background information on the common fund exception). This
exception is typically applied in class action suits. See Tiana S. Mykkeltvedt, Note,
Common Benefit and Class Actions: Eliminating Artificial Barriers to Attorney Fee
Awards, 36 GA. L. REv. 1149, 1157-58 (2002) (setting forth the requirements to be
awarded attorneys' fees in a common fund situation). The common fund exception
party was awarded attorneys' fees when the losing party willfully
disobeyed a court order or acted in bad faith. 5 The third common
law exception was the private attorney general doctrine, under which
attorneys' fees were awarded to those persons who acted as "private
attorneys general" in enforcing rights deemed to be important to the
public. 16
In its 1975 decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v.
Wilderness Society,17 the Supreme Court held that federal courts
cannot use the private attorney general doctrine to award attorneys'
fees to prevailing parties.' 8 The Court stated that only the federal
was first established in Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), where a
bondholder filed suit against the fund trustees on behalf of himself and other
railroad bondholders. Id. at 528. His efforts resulted in successfully preserving
most of the fund for the entire class. Id. at 529. The Supreme Court held that the
bondholder who started the suit was entitled to attorneys' fees from the fund for
two reasons. First, it would be unjust not to award fees since he advanced most of
the legal expenses. Id. at 532. Second, the Court felt it was unfair that the other
bondholders benefit without having incurred any time or expenses in the litigation.
Id. Thus, the reasoning behind the common fund exception is based on unjust
enrichment and equity principles. Id. at 535-36.
15. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258 (providing background information on the bad
faith exception); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1974)
(regarding this bad faith exception as one that the Court has long recognized). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain a provision similar to this exception that
states that when an attorney fails to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the merits of
the case, the court may impose "an order directing payment to the movant of some
or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result
of the violation." FED. R. Civ. P. 1 I(b)(2).
16. See Finelsen, supra note 13, at 1293. Thus, this exception encourages
socially beneficial litigation. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026,
1035-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
17. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
18. See id. at 241. In this case, environmental groups sued to prevent the
issuance of permits that were required in the construction of the Trans-Alaska oil
pipeline. Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the
environmental groups had represented the statutory rights of all citizens and were
entitled to attorneys' fees in order to encourage private parties to initiate litigation
that benefits the public. Morton, 495 F.2d at 1035-36. The Supreme Court
reversed, denying the group its attorneys' fees because no statute existed under
which they could be awarded. See generally Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 267-69. As for
the common fund and bad faith exceptions, however, the majority believed these
were "unquestionabl[e] assertions of inherent power in the courts," thus, they were
valid exceptions to the American Rule. See id. at 259. The dissent, however,
Scarborouzh v. PrincipiFall 2005
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legislature had the authority to create exceptions to the American
Rule by statute.' 9
Congress's response was both immediate and clear in its purpose.
What followed the Court's ruling showed the legislature's belief that
the availability of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in justifiable
situations was an essential element of our justice system. During the
months following the Alyeska holding, Congress held a series of
hearings to examine the Judiciary's authority to award reasonable
attorneys' fees and related expenses. 20 Within about one year after
the Court issued its ruling in Alyeska, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, a statutory exception
granting courts discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing
parties in an action or proceeding to enforce a provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.21 More hearings followed over the next several
years to expand attorneys' fees awards to prevailing parties, and
currently there are over 200 federally created statutory exceptions to
the American Rule.22
The Equal Access to Justice Act 23 (the "EAJA" or the "Act") was
included in this legislation on October 21, 1980.24 The Act
criticized the majority by suggesting that if the majority held that the private
attorney general doctrine was invalid because it was not authorized by Congress,
then the common fund and bad faith exceptions should also be invalid since they
are mere "equitable" exceptions also lacking statutory authority. See id. at 277-78
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (concluding that "the Court is willing to tolerate the
'equitable' exceptions to its analysis, not because they can be squared with it, but
because they are by now too well established to be casually dispensed with").
19. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 262.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 6 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4984 (citing three hearings before the 94th Congress on October 6, October
8, and December 3, 1975). These hearings and similar hearings that followed over
the next several years "examined the restrictive effect of Alyeska on the courts'
ability to make awards to private attorney generals and other prevailing parties."
Ward, supra note 5, at 157-58.
21. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1796, Pub.L. No. 94-559, 90
Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)).
22. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000 & Supp. 2001) (authorizing awards of
three times the damages sustained and reasonable attorneys' fees to those persons
injured by acts forbidden by the antitrust laws); 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) (2000 & Supp.
2005) (authorizing awards of reasonable attorneys' fees not in excess of 25% of the
total past due benefits to represented social security benefits claimants who win a
judgment under the Social Security Act).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
authorizes the payment of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in an
action against the United States and its federal administrative
25agencies.
While the purpose behind the Act was to ensure general agency
accountability, 26 Congress's original intent was more specific. In the
House Report that addressed the EAJA's initial enactment, Congress
proclaimed that there was evidence that federal administrative
agencies filed actions against small businesses specifically because
they did not have the resources to defend themselves adequately
against the government.27 Congress also feared that small businesses
would fail to bring even the most meritorious suits against federal
administrative agencies. 28  Congress even acknowledged that
24. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat.
2321, 2325-30 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000) and 5
U.S.C. § 504 (2000)). But the EAJA did not come into effect until October 1,
1981. § 208, 94 Stat. at 2330.
25. The EAJA was the first congressional waiver of the government's general
immunity from attorneys' fee awards. Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the
Equal Access to Justice Act - A Qualified Success, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 458,
458 (1993). The early history of federal sovereign immunity in the United States
remains the subject of considerable debate. Some have suggested that the
Constitution contains the principle of federal sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "embodied in the
Constitution"). Others believe that sovereign immunity is a common law principle
borrowed from the days when "the [English] King could do no wrong." ERWIN
CHEMERNSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.2.1, at 611 (4th ed. 2003). Whatever
the case, the presumption is that the federal government cannot be held liable for
attorneys' fees, except where expressly authorized by statute. See Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The EAJA is a
specific statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.
26. The EAJA is intended to level the playing field between private parties and
the government. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit went so far as to describe the EAJA as an "anti-bully" law. Battles Farm
Co. v. Pierce, 806 F.2d 1098, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated by 487 U.S. 1229
(1988).
27. See Krent, supra note 25, at 465 n.32, 473 n.58; see also H.R. REP. No. 96-
1418, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4988 ("In fact, there is
evidence that small businesses are the target of agency action precisely because
they do not have the resources to fully litigate the issue. This kind of truncated
justice undermines the integrity of the decision-making process.").
28. See H.R. REp. No. 96-1418 (1980), at 9, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4988. Congress found that private parties "may be deterred from seeking
Fall 2005 Scarborough v. Principi
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"[w]hile the [influence] of the bureaucracy over all aspects of life has
increased, the ability of most citizens to contest any unreasonable
exercise of authority has decreased., 29  Thus, the prospect of fee
awards for prevailing parties in suits against the government was
intended not only to act as an incentive for the parties to such
challenges, but also to deter wrongdoing in the first place.
Accordingly, the EAJA was originally enacted as an attachment to a
small business assistance bill to help small businesses against
arbitrary government action.3 °
The originally enacted EAJA contained a sunset provision that
limited the Act to an initial three-year trial run.31 The EAJA expired
on October 1, 1984. Immediately, Congress passed several
amendments to make the EAJA permanent law.32  Unfortunately,
despite legislative and popular support for the bill, President Reagan
vetoed the initiative on November 9, 1984, citing the bill as
overbroad. 33
Efforts to permanently re-enact the EAJA, however, continued.
Congress passed new legislation, including changes responsive to the
President's concerns that reinstated the EAJA retroactively to
review of... unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in
securing the vindication of their rights in civil actions and in administrative
proceedings." Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(a), 94 Stat.
2321, 2325 (1980).
29. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 10.
30. Krent, supra note 25, at 465 n.32.
31. See § 203(c), 94 Stat. at 2327 ("Effective October 1, 1984, [the EAJA is]
repealed .... ").
32. See H.R. REp. No. 99-120, pt. 1, at 6 (1985), as reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 134-35.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 99-120, pt. 1, at 6. President Reagan did not oppose the
purpose behind EAJA, and he believed that a private party should be awarded
attorneys' fees when they prevail against a federal agency. See Mary Thornton,
Reagan Signs Bill Expanding EPA Authority; Reauthorization of Equal Access to
Justice Act Vetoed, CIA Funding Approved, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1984, at A4.
He simply thought that "Congress went too far in expanding the law not only to
include official governmental litigation, but also to allow courts to look at an
agency's justification for bringing a case." Id. President Reagan said this would
lead to inefficient and wasteful litigation. Id.
October 1, 1984. 3 On August 5, 1985, President Reagan signed the
bill that permanently re-enacted the EAJA into law.
35
The final version of the EAJA 36 allows an award of attorneys'
fees and other expenses to a prevailing party if six requirements are
met. First, the claimant must qualify as a party.37  Second, the
claimant must have prevailed in an underlying civil action against the
United States. 38  Third, the prevailing party must file a timely
application for the award with the court. 3 9 Fourth, the government
must be unable to demonstrate a substantial justification for its
position. 4' Fifth, the government must be unable to demonstrate
34. See Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, §6(a), 99 Stat. 183, 186
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000) and 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2000)).
35. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act:
Court Awards of Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (pt. 1) 55
LA. L. REV. 217, 222 (1994).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (defining "party" as "an individual whose
net worth did not exceed $2,000,00 at the time the civil action was filed," or "any
owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association,
unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed
$7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed and which had not more than 500
employees at the time the civil action was filed"). Tax-exempt organizations, 26
U.S.C. 501(c)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2005), and cooperative associations as defined in
the Agricultural Marketing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1141 (2000), however, are exempt
from this definition and may be considered parties for purposes of the EAJA. See
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). This definition of "party" reflects Congress's intent to
provide fees only to those claimants who would otherwise be deterred from
vindicating their rights in court by the high costs of litigation. See supra notes 26-
30 and accompanying text.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The application must show that the
claimant is the prevailing party. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The application must
also include the amount sought and a statement that the position of the United
States government in the underlying litigation was not substantially justified. 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). To meet the timeliness requirement, the claimant must
submit the application within thirty days of final judgment in the underlying
litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). If the government is able to make this
showing, then the claimant cannot recover attorneys' fees.
Fall 2005 Scarborough v. Principi
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special circumstances that would make the award of fees unjust.
4 1
Finally, the fee must be reasonable.42
These hurdles demonstrate the legislative strength behind the
EAJA's permanent enactment. On account of that support, the EAJA
provides for fees and costs in nearly every civil claim brought by or
against the United States, including federal administrative agencies.
4 3
By affording such broad application, the EAJA represents an
important exception to the American Rule on attorneys' fees.
III. FACTS
In Scarborough, after prevailing in an underlying action, the
petitioner applied for attorneys' fees and expenses under the EAJA. 44
The question before the Court was whether a timely EAJA
application can be amended after the filing period has run to cure an
initial failure to allege that the government's position in the
underlying litigation lacked substantial justification.45
The petitioner, Randall C. Scarborough ("Scarborough"), served
in the United States Navy from 1972 to 1975.46 In 1976, the veteran
sought disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs
47
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). If the government is able to make this
showing, then the claimant cannot recover attorneys' fees.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (defining "fees and expenses" as "reasonable
expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis,
engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for
the preparation of the party's case, and reasonable attorneys' fees" generally based
upon the market rates for such services furnished).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (providing that a court may award
attorneys' fees incurred by the claimant "in any civil action, including proceedings
for judicial review of agency action, . . . in any court having jurisdiction of that
action" (emphasis added)).
44. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 408 (2004).
45. Id. at 406.
46. Steve Lash, Court Considers Amendment to Fee Request, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Feb. 24, 2004, at 2.
47. The Department of Veterans Affairs is a cabinet department established in
1989. Facts About the Department of Veterans Affairs,
http://wwwl.va.gov/opa/fact/vafacts.html (June 2005). It succeeded the Veterans
Administration and is responsible for providing federal benefits to veterans. Id.
due to a renal disease.4 8 A local office of Veterans Affairs, however,
denied him those benefits because they claimed his disorder was
unrelated to his military service in the Navy.49
Scarborough challenged that decision with the Board of Veterans'
Appeals (the "Board"). 50 In July 1998, the Board resolved that the
regional office's decision "contained no clear and unmistakable
error." 51  Scarborough appealed the Board's decision before the
United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("CAVC"). On
July 9, 1999, the CAVC reversed and granted Scarborough
retroactive benefits for the period of 1975 to 1993.52 The CAVC said
that both the regional office and the Board failed to identify sufficient
evidence in the record supporting the initial finding by the regional
office that Scarborough's disorder was unrelated to his Navy
service. 3
Following this victory, Scarborough's attorney filed an
application for attorneys' fees54 under the EAJA.55 The application
48. See Scarborough v. West, 13 Vet. App. 530, 531 (2000) (per curiam),
vacated, 536 U.S. 920 (2002). Togo D. West, Jr., was the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs when Scarborough first filed his claim. West served as the Secretary from
1998 to 2000, when he was succeeded by Anthony J. Principi. Facts About the
Department of Veterans Affairs, supra note 47.
49. See West, 13 Vet. App. at 531. Veterans Affairs argued that Scarborough's
disease began in 1976 after his military discharge, but Scarborough insisted that he
was diagnosed in 1975, when he had active military status. Tamika D. Hawkins,
On the Docket: Scarborough, Randall v. Principi, Anthony, Secy. of Veterans
Affairs, Medill School of Journalism, http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/-secure/
docket/mt/archives/000759.php (June 23, 2004).
50. See West, 13 Vet. App. at 531. As a part of the Department of Veterans
Affairs, the Board of Veterans Appeals is the administrative board that reviews
decisions made by regional offices of the Department such as the one made against
Scarborough in 1976. See Gateway to VA Appeals, http://www.va.gov/vbs/bva/
(last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
51. West, 13 Vet. App. at 531.
52. Hawkins, supra note 49.
53. See Lash, supra note 46, at 2; see also West, 13 Vet. App. at 531 (The
CAVC said that both decisions "failed to address the effect of the law existing at
the time of the [regional office] decision regarding the presumption of sound
condition.").
54. The application sought attorneys' fees of $19,333.75 and costs of $117.80.
Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 409.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
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was filed within the statutory deadline, 56 and its content satisfied all
EAJA requirements57 except that it failed to allege that the position
of the United States 58 was not substantially justified.5 9 On December
3, 1999, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs filed a motion to dismiss
the application for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that Scarborough
failed to include the required statement in his fee application. 60 In
response, on December 9, 1999, Scarborough's attorney filed an
amendment to the application, in which he included the allegation
that the government's position lacked substantial justification in the
underlying litigation.6 1 Unfortunately for Scarborough and his
attorney, the thirty-day filing period expired before the amended
application was filed.62 Thus, on June 14, 2000, the CAVC
56. Scarborough's attorney actually filed two applications. He filed the first
prematurely because the deadline to file post-decision motions had not yet expired,
and the clerk at the CAVC returned it to the attorney. See Scarborough, 541 U.S.
at 409. Once the CAVC issued a judgment noting that the time for filing post-
decision motions had expired, the attorney filed a second application. Id. The
second application, however, was also premature because the deadline to appeal the
CAVC's judgment had not yet expired. Id. This time, though, the clerk at the
CAVC kept the application until the deadline to appeal passed and filed it on
October 4, 1999. Id.; see also West, 13 Vet. App. at 531 (Scarborough's attorney
submitted the second premature application on August 19, 1999.). The second
application is the one at issue in this case.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
58. In this case, "United States" refers to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
who was Anthony J. Principi at the time Scarborough v. Principi was decided. See
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(C) (defining the term to include "any agency and any
official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity"). Anthony J.
Principi held this position from 2001 to 2005. Facts About the Department of
Veterans Affairs, supra note 47. This note will interchange the words "United
States," "government," and the "Secretary" when referring to such party,
depending upon the context in which the term is used.
59. See West, 13 Vet. App. at 531. Both of the premature applications failed to
include the required allegation. The application relevant in this case did, however,
include all the other content requirements. It stated that Scarborough was the
prevailing party pursuant to the July 9, 1999 remand order, his net worth did not
exceed the two million dollars limit for filing under the EAJA, his attorney had
represented him in the matter since August 1998, and the attorney had incurred fees
and expenses during the course of representation. Id. A detailed description of
fees and expenses was attached to the application. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 532.
dismissed the fee application holding that it was "jurisdictionally
deficient" and that the court lacked jurisdiction over it.63
Scarborough then appealed the CAVC's decision before the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.64 On December 10, 2001,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the CAVC's holding.65  The United
States Supreme Court granted Scarborough's petition for a writ of
certiorari. On June 17, 2002, the Court vacated the Federal Circuit's
judgment and remanded it in light of Edelman v. Lynchburg
College.6 6  On remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed its earlier
decision by distinguishing Edelman.67  The Supreme Court again
63. Id. In the majority opinion of Scarborough v. Principi, the Court states
that the issue before the CAVC should not have been a question of jurisdiction, but
the timing of the amendment. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 413.
64. Scarborough v. Principi, 273 F.3d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam), vacated, 536 U.S. 920 (2002).
65. Scarborough v. Principi, 273 F.3d at 1089 (stating that the "EAJA must be
construed strictly in favor of the Government" pursuant to the Supreme Court's
narrow construction of waivers of sovereign immunity). The Federal Circuit did,
however, acknowledge that its decision conflicted with EAJA interpretations made
by other circuit courts. In Dunn v. United States, the prevailing party submitted an
EAJA application within the thirty-day deadline and subsequently supplemented it
after the deadline had passed with an initially absent detailed description of the
fees. See Dunn v. United States, 775 F.2d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 1985). The Third
Circuit held that the lower court could consider the application on its merits if the
government was not prejudiced. See id. In Singleton v. Apfel, the Eleventh Circuit
also held that an EAJA application could be amended after the filing deadline had
expired to include two initially absent allegations: that the applicant was qualified
to apply for fees under the EAJA and that the government's position in the
underlying litigation was not substantially justified. See Singleton v. Apfel, 231
F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2000). The Federal Circuit maintained that the plain
language of the statute should control and declared that the Third Circuit and
Eleventh Circuit unjustifiably disregarded a primary tool of statutory interpretation.
See Scarborough v. Principi, 273 F.3d at 1091.
66. Scarborough v. Principi, 536 U.S. 920 (2002). In Edelman, the Court
upheld an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulation that allowed a
timely filed employment discrimination charge filed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to add, after the filing deadline, an initially absent required
verification. See Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 122 (2002). The
Court explained that Title VII permitted this "relation back." Id.
67. Scarborough v. Principi, 319 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 541 U.S.
401 (2004). This majority represented two of the three Federal Circuit judges,
whereas the court's first opinion regarding this matter was per curiam. See supra
note 64. The Federal Circuit distinguished Becker and Edelman with three points.
First, the court recognized Title VII, which was the statute at issue in Edelman, as a
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granted Scarborough's petition for writ of certiorari, and reversed and
remanded the Federal Circuit's decision in favor of Scarborough.68
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Ginsburg delivered the majority opinion for the Court. 69
In the introduction and Part L.A of the opinion, the Court provided
background information on the EAJA, and the EAJA requirements
that are specifically relevant to this case. y° The Court noted that the
EAJA departs from the American Rule on attorneys' fees. 71 The Act
authorizes the payment of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in an
action against the United States absent a showing by the government
that its position in the underlying litigation was substantially
justified. 2 Particular to this dispute, the Court explained that the
EAJA requires that the prevailing party apply for such fees "within
thirty days of final judgment in the action." This application must
include an allegation that "the position of the United States7 3 was not
remedial scheme in which laypersons often initiate the process, whereas the EAJA
is directed to attorneys who do not need the same "paternalistic protection."
Scarborough v. Principi, 319 F.3d at 1353. Second, the court observed that the
respective timeliness and verification requirements at issue in Becker and Edelman
appear in separate statutory provisions, while the EAJA's thirty-day filing deadline
and content requirements are detailed in the same statutory provision. Id. Third,
the Federal Circuit discussed the importance of the allegation as an EAJA
requirement. The court stated that the allegation was distinguishable from the
verification requirement in Edelman and the signature requirement in Becker
because it was "not simply a tool to weed out frivolous claims, but rather ... one
portion of the basis of the award itself." See id.
68. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 423.
69. Id. at 404. Justice Ginsburg was joined in her opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at
403.
70. See id. at 404-08.
71. Id. at 404.
72. Id. at 405.
73. This note will interchange the words "United States," "government," and
the "Secretary" when referring to such party, depending upon the context in which
the sentence is used. See supra note 58.
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substantially justified."74  The Court noted that the congressional
purpose behind the EAJA's enactment was "to eliminate the barriers
that prohibit small businesses and individuals from securing
vindication of their rights in civil actions and administrative
proceedings brought by or against the Federal Government."75
In Part II of the majority opinion, the Court developed its
analysis. First, it clarified that the question before the Court, whether
Scarborough was time barred from being awarded attorneys' fees
under the EAJA, "[did] not concern the federal courts' 'subject
matter jurisdiction."' 7 6 The Court pointed out that the EAJA does not
describe what kinds of cases a court is competent to adjudicate,77 but,
rather, relates only to post-judgment proceedings ancillary to the case
already within that court's jurisdiction.78 Here, the CAVC already
had complete jurisdiction over the case. 79  More particularly, the
issue presented a "question of time." 80 So the issue before the Court
74. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 405. The EAJA also requires that the application
include a showing that the applicant is a prevailing party, a showing that the
applicant is eligible to receive an award, and a statement of the amount sought. See
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2000).
75. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 406 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1005, at 9
(1980)).
76. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 413. The Court probably addressed this issue
first because, in the underlying litigation, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
("CAVC") granted the Respondent's motion to dismiss Scarborough's initial
defective application for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
77. Id. at 414.
78. Id. The EAJA authorizes a court to award fees incurred "in any civil
action" brought against the United States "in any court having jurisdiction of that
action." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000). Thus, an application for fees is proper
when filed in a court in which the prevailing party has already won its case.
79. See Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 413 n.3. In July 1998, the Board of Veterans
Appeals ("Board") denied Scarborough's claim for disability benefits. Id. The
CAVC has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board. 38 U.S.C. §
7252(a) (1994). Scarborough appealed that decision before the CAVC and
prevailed in July 1999. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 413 n.3; see also supra notes 50-
53 and accompanying text (The CAVC held that the Board had no evidence to
support their denial of benefits.). Thus, the CAVC had exclusive jurisdiction over
Scarborough's case before his attorney applied for fees in 1999.
80. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 413.
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was when, not whether, the EAJA required Scarborough to allege that
"the position of the United States [was] not substantially justified.",81
Next, the Court characterized the nature of the required
statement. It noted that all of the other EAJA requirements for the
application's contents are things the applicant must show,82 but the
required statement imposes no burden of proof on the fee applicant. 83
As such, the Court concluded that the required statement here is
"nothing more than an allegation or pleading requirement." 84
The Court felt the nature of the required statement justified
applying the relation back doctrine,8 5 which allowed Scarborough's
late statement to date back to the original defective application filed
before the deadline had expired. The Court supported its position by
comparing the missing required statement in this case to the missing
requirements from Becker v. Montgomery86 and Edelman v.
Lynchburg College.87 In Becker, the litigant timely filed a notice of
appeal but forgot to sign his name as required under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 (a) .88 The Court allowed the litigant to add his
signature to the notice after the filing deadline had passed because
there was "no genuine doubt...about who [was] appealing, from what
judgment, [and] to which appellate court."89 Similarly, the Court in
Scarborough noted that the required statement does not serve to give
the government any kind of notice. 9° In Edelman, a professor filed
81. Id.
82. Id. at 414. The applicant must show that he is a prevailing party, that he is
eligible to receive such an award of attorneys' fees, and the amount sought. 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2000).
83. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 414. The burden of proof is on the government
to establish that its position was substantially justified. Id.
84. Id.
85. The relation back doctrine is now codified as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c), which allows for an amendment of a pleading to relate back to the
date of the original pleading. See FED R. Civ. P. (1 5)(c).
86. Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001).
87. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002).
88. Becker, 532 U.S. at 759.
89. Id. at 767.
90. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 416. From the moment Scarborough filed his fee
application, the government already knew who the applicant was, what he was
requesting, and that it had the burden to prove that its position in the underlying
litigation was substantially justified. Id. at 416-17.
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an employment discrimination charge under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.91 He was required to include a form verifying by
oath or affirmation the charge of discrimination but failed to do so.92
The Court in Edelman determined that the professor's late
verification could relate back because the purpose behind the
requirement was to stop litigants from litigating irresponsibly. 93 The
Scarborough Court stated that the required statement also served to
ward off any irresponsible litigation by obligating the fee applicant to
examine the government's position and to determine whether or not it
was substantially justified before applying for attorneys' fees under
the EAJA.94 Thus, in light of Becker and Edelman, the Court
reasoned that the relation back doctrine should also apply to
Scarborough's case.
Another reason the Court used the relation back doctrine was
because of who would specifically benefit from its application. The
Court emphasized that allowing the amendment benefits the applicant
directly, not his attorney, because the lawyer's statutory contingency
fee would be reduced dollar for dollar by an EAJA award. 95
The Court then addressed the government's contention that the
relation back doctrine is only for pleadings.96 It explained that, while
Scarborough conceded that Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
91. Edelman, 535 U.S. at 110.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 118. The Court believed that if the signature in Becker, which
was decided prior to Edelman, could be related back, then it was reasonable for the
verification to relate back to the Title VII discrimination charge. Id. at 122.
94. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 415. In allocating the burden of pleading to the
applicant, Justice Ginsburg argued that Congress intended to dispel any assumption
that the government must pay fees each time it loses. Id. Thus, the burden to plead
is merely a means to get the fee applicant to "think twice" before applying for
attorneys' fees under the EAJA. Id. In other words, if the applicant truly believes
that the government's position in the underlying case was not substantially
justified, the applicant should go ahead and apply for fees; but, if the applicant
believes the government's case may have been substantially justified, the applicant
should probably not apply for such fees. Id.
95. Id. at 417.
96. Id. The government argued that the relation back doctrine does not apply
to fee applications because Rule 15(c), which is the codified version of the
doctrine, permits the relation back of amendments to the "original pleading." FED.
R. Civ. P. 15(c).
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Procedure97 is directed only to pleadings, the Court has previously
applied the doctrine to non-pleadings. 98 The Court also argued that it
applied the relation back doctrine before the doctrine was first
described by the Advisory Committee in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.99 In fact, the Court noted that the relation back doctrine
"has its roots in the former federal equity practice and a number of
state codes."' 0'  The Court further explained that Scarborough's
amended application "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth" in the initial
application, which is required by the relation back doctrine.' 0 ' So the
Court determined that the initially absent allegation was not "beyond
repair" and could relate back to the amended EAJA application.10 2
97. Rule 15(c) is the codified version of the relation back doctrine.
98. See Becker, supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text; see also Edelman,
supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
99. The government conceded that the relation back doctrine was not invented
by the federal rule-makers. The Supreme Court applied the doctrine well before
the Federal Rules became effective in 1938. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R.
v. Kinney, 260 U.S. 340, 346 (1922) (holding that an amendment that merely
expanded the allegations in support of the cause of action already alleged in the
original complaint was not affected by the intervening lapse of time); see also
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Renn, 241 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1916) (holding that an
amendment that merely expanded the original complaint could relate back to the
commencement of the suit); see also Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570,
575-76 (1913) (holding that the plaintiff may relate back an amendment where the
plaintiff sues as a personal representative on the same cause of action under a
federal statute instead of as a sole beneficiary of the deceased under a state statute
because that is not the same as beginning a new action).
100. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 418 (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1496 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 2004)). Justice
Ginsburg cited Federal Equity Rule 19, which authorizes a court, in furtherance of
justice, to permit a process, proceeding, pleading, or record to be amended at any
time, and Illinois and Washington statutes that permit the same. Scarborough, 541
U.S. at 418 n.5.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).
102. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 418-19. Regardless of whether or not the
relation back doctrine applies, however, Scarborough argued that the thirty-day
filing deadline should not apply to the required statement. The EAJA includes the
deadline requirement and the other content specifications in one sentence:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty
days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for
fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party
and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount
The Court then proceeded to address the government's contention
that the EAJA's "waiver of sovereign immunity from liability for
fees is conditioned on the fee applicant's meticulous compliance with
each and every requirement . . . within thirty days of final
judgment."' 0 3 The Court disagreed. 10 4 First, it pointed out that the
Federal Circuit had previously ruled that an EAJA application may
be amended after the filing deadline to show that the applicant was
eligible to receive the award.10 5 Second, the Court pointed out that
its own prior decisions recognized that, in general, statutory
deadlines to file should apply to the government in the same way
they apply to private parties because it would amount "to little, if
sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert
witness representing or appearing on behalf of the party stating the actual
time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were
computed.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2000). The allegation requirement is mentioned in the
following sentence. Id. ("The party shall also allege that the position of the United
States was not substantially justified."). Scarborough pointed out that Congress
separated these sentences intending to limit the time deadline to all the other
requirements except the allegation requirement. See Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 419
n.6. Scarborough further supported his argument by comparing the two sentences
and concluding that the sentence containing the allegation requirement is structured
differently from the first sentence. Id. Scarborough said the fact that Congress
required the party to "allege" rather than "show" that the government's position
was not substantially justified indicates that the allegation requirement is separate
from the time deadline. Id. The Court, however, did not further explore this issue
since it already found that the relation back doctrine applies. Id. The dissent
argued that the Court should have considered this. See infra notes 114-21 and
accompanying text.
103. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 419-20. The government believed the failure to
include the required allegation in the fee application before the thirty-day filing
deadline was a fatal omission. Id. at 420.
104. Id.
105. See Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding
that a timely filed EAJA application may be amended after the thirty-day filing
deadline has passed to meet an additional requirement of eligibility for attorneys'
fees if it would not prejudice the government). On remand before the Federal
Circuit for the second time, Chief Judge Mayer issued a dissenting opinion in the
Scarborough case stating that Bazalo controls and is not distinguishable as the
majority had argued. See Scarborough v. Principi, 319 F.3d 1346, 1355-56 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 541 U.S. 401 (2004).
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any, broadening of the congressional waiver." 10 6 Notwithstanding
these prior decisions, the Court thought that a more yielding reading
of the EAJA provision was justified because it was sufficiently
similar to other fee-shifting statutes for prevailing parties applicable
to lawsuits between private litigants.'0 7
Finally, the Court argued that its holding would not unfairly
prejudice the government. 10 8  The Court conceded that if it did
unfairly prejudice the government, then the relation back doctrine
would not apply in the case. 10 9 The government, however, did not
raise the issue, and the Court, on its own examination, found that the
government would not incur any unfair prejudice.110
Therefore, the Court held that Scarborough's timely fee
application could be amended after the thirty-day filing deadline had
expired, which would cure his initial failure to include the allegation
that the government's position in the underlying litigation lacked
substantial justification. 1" The Court reversed the Federal Circuit's
106. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 421 (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)). The Court discussed two cases in support. The
first, Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, involved equitable tolling, "[t]he
doctrine that the statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite
diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the limitations period had
expired." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (8th ed. 2004). The Court held that
equitable tolling could apply in Title VII employment discrimination claims against
the government as "a realistic assessment of legislative intent." Irwin, 498 U.S. at
95. The Scarborough Court believed the same was true of the case before it since,
in enacting the EAJA, Congress expressed that "at a minimum, the [government]
should be held to the same standards in litigating as private parties." Scarborough,
541 U.S. at 421 n.9 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 9 (1980), as reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4987). Second, in Franconia Associates v. United
States, 536 U.S. 129 (2002), the Court refused to interpret the statute of limitations
in an unduly restrictive way for claims filed against the government under the
Tucker Act. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 421.
107. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 422. This point dismissed the government's
argument that Irwin and Franconia were distinguishable because they involved
awards under private litigation whereas the EAJA authorized awards of attorneys'
fees under rules that had no private litigation analogue. See id. at 421-22.
108. Id. at 423.
109. Id. at 422.
110. See id. Further, the EAJA has a built-in check for such unfair prejudice
inflicted on the government. Id. at 422-23 (quoting the EAJA provision that
disallows fees where "special circumstances make an award unjust").
111. Id. at 423.
ruling and remanded the case for consideration and determination of
Scarborough's EAJA application on the merits.' 12
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas delivered the Court's dissenting opinion. 1 3 He
began by criticizing the Court's application of the relation back
doctrine. Justice Thomas felt that the majority should have first
answered whether the thirty-day deadline even applied to the
requirement that a fee applicant must allege that the government's
position in the underlying litigation was not substantially justified." 4
The dissent interpreted the EAJA as applying the thirty-day
deadline to the required allegation and thought this was a "better
reading of the text."' 1 5 The EAJA provides its requirements in two
separate sentences. 1 6 The first sentence imposes the thirty-day filing
deadline; additionally, it requires the applicant to show that he is a
prevailing party, show that he is eligible to receive an award under
the EAJA, and specify the amount he seeks."l 7 In the second
sentence, the EAJA requires that the applicant "shall also" make the
allegation that the government was not substantially justified in the
underlying litigation.1 8 The dissent turned to the dictionary, and
found that "also" is defined as "likewise" or "in like manner."' 9
Justice Thomas concluded that the filing deadline from the first
sentence applied to the required allegation referenced in the second
sentence.1 20  Moreover, he believed that "it [was] quite natural to
112. Id. The Federal Circuit issued an order dated June 15, 2004 for the
CAVC to consider the merits of the application. Scarborough v. Principi, 18 Vet.
App. 434 (2004).
113. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 423 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
was joined in his opinion by Justice Scalia. Id.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 424.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2000).
117. Scarborough, 514 U.S. at 424.
118. Id.
119. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 424 n.1 (quoting Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary).
120. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 424.
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read [the statute] as applying the . . . deadline to all of its
requirements." '2 '
Because the dissent concluded that the deadline did apply to the
required allegation, it thought that the next question before the Court
should have been whether the relation back doctrine was correctly
applied in Scarborough's particular case. 122 The dissent found that
the EAJA did not specifically allow for Scarborough's amended
application to relate back to the time of his initial filing, and that the
Court was wrong to validate such an application. 123 In support, the
dissent pointed out that the statute's text makes no mention of the
doctrine, and argued that the scope of the government's waiver of
sovereign immunity should have been strictly construed because the
EAJA requirement for filing a timely fee application was a condition
on the waiver.' 24  The dissent criticized the Court's distortion of
Irwin's scope in leading to different conclusions. 125 Justice Thomas
urged that Irwin only narrows the scope of the government's waiver
in limited circumstances, such as where the government is sued to the
same extent and in the same manner as private parties, which did not
extend to Scarborough's situation since there was no "readily
identifiable private-litigation equivalent" to the EAJA. 126 Because
Scarborough failed to include the required allegation, his application
failed to meticulously comply with all EAJA requirements; as such,
the dissent concluded that application of the relation back doctrine
was barred.127 Accordingly, Justice Thomas respectfully dissented
from the Court's opinion. 128
121. Id. The dissenting opinion also cites several federal regulations that
follow this reading of the statute. See id. at 425 n.3.
122. Id. at 425-26.
123. Id. at 426.
124. Id.; see also Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991) ("Any [waiver of
sovereign immunity] must be strictly construed in favor of the United States.").
125. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 427.
126. Id. Instead, the dissent said the EAJA authorized fee awards against the
government when there was no basis for recovery under the rules for private
litigation. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
V. IMPACT
The aftermath of the Supreme Court's ruling in Scarborough v.
Principi is not likely to be far reaching. In the end, the decision
given by the Court will probably have no great effect on the instances
of arbitrary action by administrative bodies or in encouraging private
parties to challenge such action. The decision does, however, extend
previous Supreme Court precedent and reinforces the use of equity
principles in interpreting fee-shifting statutes where legislative
purpose and intent prevail over a plain language approach. 29
Further, the decision may protect an underlying interest in public
confidence in our justice system.
A. Judicial Impact
The most certain impact of the decision in Scarborough is its
precedence. The opinion reiterates the rationale used in the Supreme
Court cases Becker v. Montgomery130 and Edelman v. Lynchburg
College,131 while also extending application of the relation back
doctrine to fee-shifting statutes such as the Equal Access to Justice
Act 132 ("EAJA"). Applications for awards under fee-shifting statutes
missing a non-fatal requirement will be considered on its merits once
amended, rather than dismissed pursuant to a mechanical application
of the rules. 1
33
129. See e.g., Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 763-68 (2001) (holding
that the requirement related back since it did not serve a notice-giving function);
Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll.., 535 U.S. 106, 112-15 (2002) (holding that the
requirement related back since its purpose was to stop irresponsible litigation);
Dunn v. United States, 775 F.2d 99, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the
requirement related back since the government would not be prejudiced);
Singleton v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 853, 858 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
requirement related back since the government's interests in finality and reliance
were not burdened).
130. Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001). See supra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
131. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002). See supra notes 91-93
and accompanying text.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000).
133. At the time the author wrote this note, several cases addressing the issue
of relating back amendments made after the filing deadline had passed were
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The Scarborough decision also reinforces the use of equity
principles, legislative purpose, and legislative intent in relating back
certain statutory requirements, rather than a strict interpretation of the
language. The Court recognized that there is a difference between a
fatally defective requirement and a non-fatal requirement, and that a
non-fatal requirement did not hinder Congress' purpose and intent
behind the EAJA. 13 4 By extension, the Court also relied on equitable
principles when it considered that allowing Scarborough's
application to relate back to the initial filing benefited the applicant
directly, and not his attorney, and that the government would not
incur unfair prejudice due to the Court's decision.
B. Administrative Impact
The impact that the Scarborough decision will have on federal
administrative agencies will not be extremely significant. The
opinion addresses a proceeding for attorneys' fees ancillary to an
underlying proceeding where the government had already lost. Thus,
the decision provides agencies with little additional incentive to
decrease arbitrary action.
Scarborough sends a strong message that the Court respects the
legislative intent behind the EAJA and is not willing to allow minor
technicalities to hinder that purpose. Administrative agencies would
be foolish not to heed the guidance that it gives. Some agencies may
choose to ensure that their actions are reasonable and fair against
private parties before litigation occurs. While it is certainly
unreasonable for an administrative agency to rely on opposing
counsel's mistake in releasing them from the legal duty to pay the
decided subsequent to the Scarborough decision. These courts discussed the
decision in Scarborough as precedent. See, e.g., Townsend v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 415 F.3d 578, 581-83 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the EAJA time limitation
for fee applications is subject to equitable tolling); Save Our Creeks v. City of
Brooklyn Park, 682 N.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a
corporate pleading lacking an attorney's signature may be amended to add the
attorney's signature and the amendment may relate back to the date of the original
pleading).
134. Congress intended the EAJA to encourage wronged individuals to file
meritorious claims against federal administrative agencies, and ultimately, to
decrease arbitrary action by these agencies. See supra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text.
prevailing party's attorneys' fees, administrative bodies, aware of
how courts treat such matters, may be more likely to adjust their
actions and decisions.
C. Social Impact
The Court's decision serves to assist and protect citizens wronged
by arbitrary government action. To the average American, however,
the Scarborough decision will probably provide no additional
incentive to challenge the government. Realistically, the average
reasonable litigant will not consider the possibility and resulting
consequences of their attorney's mistakes, whether procedural or
substantive. Thus, this decision is not likely to result in a significant
increase in claims against arbitrary government action.
On the other hand, the case may serve to increase public
confidence in our judicial system. Deflecting the burden and
consequences of the attorney's non-fatal mistake away from the
litigant might seem fair and just to the public because it protects the
private litigant from his attorney's careless mistakes. The general
rule regarding the attorney-client relationship is that the client is
charged with his counsel's negligent acts since he is presumed to
have voluntarily chosen the attorney as his representative or agent. 35
Still, from the client's point of view, to punish him for his attorney's
negligent failure to include a pleading requirement that is clearly and
unambiguously set forth in a statute is grossly unfair. Although the
agency relationship exists, a client in such a position would feel that
it stops short of the attorney's negligent actions over which he, the
litigant, has absolutely no control. 136 Had the Scarborough Court
allowed the Department of Veterans' Affairs to use the technicality
of that non-fatal mistake to their advantage, the petitioner would have
been left with the decision to either pay out of his own pocket 137 or
135. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S.
380, 396-97 (1993).
136. In Pioneer, the Supreme Court determined that an attorney's "excusable
neglect" was a question of equity where the court must take into account the
surrounding circumstances, including whether the mistake was within the
reasonable control of the client. Id. at 395.
137. In the typical case of individuals seeking past-due benefits from the
government, attorneys are paid a contingent fee based on a percentage of the
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sue his attorney for malpractice. To leave the petitioner with these
two options contradicts the congressional intent behind the EAJA. 3
This decision precludes the burden from falling on the attorney to not
take away from the seriousness of his mistake, but rather so that the
wronged private citizen will endure no more of a burden than
necessary. Thus, the Court in Scarborough seeks to render justice at
the minimum cost to the parties, which the average American should
appreciate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's ruling in Scarborough v. Principi may not
have a significant or far reaching impact in regard to its
administrative implications, but it will affect subsequent court
decisions and may affect public confidence in our judiciary system.
Our nation is comprised of many more individuals seeking to
vindicate their rights than just Mr. Scarborough, and many more
government agencies than the Department of Veterans' Affairs.
Decisions subsequent to Scarborough will continue to reflect the
importance of congressional purpose and intent in applying the
relation back doctrine to non-fatal mistakes.' 39 The decision may
also inspire citizens to use the law to stop administrative agencies
from overreaching their powers. If there is less agency misconduct
against private parties, potential litigants will have fewer claims to
pursue. The result will benefit everyone involved - agencies will
spend less time and less of their already limited resources in
defending themselves in court, fewer litigants will step foot inside a
courtroom, and courts will have lighter caseloads. On the other hand,
even if administrative agencies do not act less arbitrarily against
private parties and courts continue to see a steady load of actions
benefits. See Sisk, supra note 35, at 335 n. 763. If the individual is not awarded
attorneys' fees under the EAJA, his attorney would most likely receive a contingent
fee. The contingency, however, decreases a client's benefits by the amount of the
attorneys' fees, reducing the amount of benefits that the client takes home. Dowdy
v. Bowen, 636 F. Supp 591, 594 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
138. Congress intended the EAJA to encourage individuals wronged by
arbitrary government action to bring lawsuits against the government. See supra
notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 133.
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against the government, the Scarborough decision, at minimum,
seeks to protect the private party from the unfortunate and careless
mistakes of his attorney. Either way, the private party is better
protected, sustaining Congress' intent behind the EAJA's enactment.
The degree to which the decision will deter agency overreaching and
create stronger incentives for a private party to file suit against the
government remains to be seen. What is more certain is that
decisions rendered by courts and the potential boost in public
confidence in our judicial system in light of Scarborough v. Principi
will secure a better "triumph" for the individual private citizen.

